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Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge?
∗
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INTRODUCTION

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) that Congress adopted in
1925 bears little resemblance to the Act as the Supreme Court of the
United States has construed it. The original Act was intended to provide federal courts with procedural law that would permit the enforcement of arbitration agreements between merchants in diversity
1
cases. The Supreme Court’s construction of the statute, especially in
the last twenty-five years, amounts to a judicially created legislative
program, imposed without congressional input, that has vastly expanded the reach and focus of the original statute. As construed by
the Supreme Court, the statute now permits arbitration of statutory
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The 1924 House Report provided, for example:
Whether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a
question of procedure to be determined by the law court in which the
proceeding is brought and not one of substantive law to be determined
by the law of the forum in which the contract is made. Before such
contracts could be enforced in the Federal courts, therefore, this law is
essential.
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924); see also Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes:
Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th
Cong. 5–10 (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (describing the purpose of FAA as to
provide an inexpensive way to resolve disputes of merchants or of anyone engaged in
buying and selling); id. at 31 (statement of Thomas B. Paton, American Bankers’ Association) (presenting ABA resolution of support, citing, in part, that “all merchants
doing interstate and foreign business seek a method whereby disputes arising in their
daily business transactions can be speedily, economically, and equitably disposed
of”); infra text accompanying notes 134–153. See generally Paul D. Carrington & Paul
H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331 (discussing Supreme
Court arbitration jurisprudence); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How
the Supreme Court Created A Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 99 (2006) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s tendency to expand the scope
of the FAA).
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claims, as well as arbitration under adhesion contracts where the
3
weaker party has not given actual consent to arbitrate. Moreover, although workers were specifically excluded from the coverage of the
4
original act, the Court’s construction of the statute permits employ5
ers to impose arbitration on employees. The Court has also construed the statute to preempt state contract law that attempts to pro6
tect citizens from the abuses of arbitration.
These are major
expansions of the original statute, unforeseeable at the time of pas7
sage.
The Court’s construction of the FAA has had substantial consequences for our legal system. Taken together, the Courts’ arbitration
opinions reflect policies similar to those in vogue in the early twentieth century, favoring big business over consumers and employees
while showing antipathy to state and federal laws and regulations pro8
tecting rights of individuals and small businesses. These policy deci-

2
See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985).
3
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268–69 (1995); Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 23. See generally Jean Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just? 57
STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005); David Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, Set it Free: How
“Mandatory” Undermines “Arbitration,” 8 NEV. L.J. 400 (2007).
4
See Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) (statement of W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman of the Committee of Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law of the American Bar Association)
(explaining that the statute was not intended to cover workers); see also Moses, supra
note 1, at 105–06 (discussing a letter from Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, to Congress emphasizing that the legislation did not and should not apply to
workers).
5
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
6
See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996). For other cases holding that the FAA preempts state law, see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); see also David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism
Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 5, 54 (“Southland and its progeny are
the result of bad statutory interpretation and even worse federalism. The historical
evidence demonstrates that Congress never intended to preempt state law regulating
arbitration agreements.”).
7
See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 1, at 402 (“[I]f the FAA had been presented to Congress, as legislation having the effects ascribed to them by the Court, [it
would not] have been assured of a single vote of approval.”).
8
See Moses, supra note 1, at 158 (“[T]he Court has used various statutory interpretation techniques to reduce the protections legislated in the fields of federal antitrust, securities, and employment law and has intruded upon state police powers to
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sions need to be carefully examined by today’s Congress, which
should not relinquish to the Court the right to legislate about arbitration or to determine arbitration policy. Congress has an obligation to
ensure that legislation it has enacted serves the interest of its constituents, and does not become, through judicial construction, entirely
different legislation that does not support and may even contradict
9
the original statute that Congress enacted.
One of the major paradigm shifts in arbitration has arisen out of
the Supreme Court’s decision to permit arbitration of statutory
10
claims. Arbitration of statutory claims was not a purpose of the 1925
Act, which Congress adopted to permit enforcement of arbitration
11
agreements in federal court for contract claims between merchants.
Moreover, statutory claims simply are not as well protected in an arbi12
tration process as in a judicial process. As will be discussed below,
arbitration does not provide the same level of discovery or the same
procedural rights as litigation, nor does it provide for meaningful
13
judicial review.
Thus, when disputes over matters affecting civil
prevent states from enforcing legislation designed to protect their citizens against an
unfair or unreasonable imposition of arbitration.”).
9
There are currently some bills before Congress that, if adopted, would eliminate pre-dispute arbitration in certain areas, such as in consumer purchases, employment contracts, and nursing home contracts. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of
2009, S. 931, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration
Act of 2009, S. 512, H.R. 1237, 111th Cong. (2009); Consumer Fairness Act of 2009,
H.R. 991, 111th Cong. (2009). These bills do not, however, address issues such as
the broad preemption of state contract law by the FAA; the Court’s delegation of
power to decide claims under mandatory laws to citizen-arbitrators, whose awards are
not subject to judicial review on the merits; the Court’s judicially created policy of
favoring arbitration over litigation; or the elimination of any possibility of judicial
review in accordance with party agreement.
10
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616
(1985) (requiring arbitration in Japan of U.S. antitrust claims raised by car dealership); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (“It is
by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement,
enforceable pursuant to the FAA.”); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 534
(1974) (holding that claims under the Securities Act of 1934 were arbitrable).
11
See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 5–10.
12
See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am. Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1955).
Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury . . . . Arbitrators do not have
the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they need not give their
reasons for their results; the record of their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial review of an award is more limited than judicial review of a trial . . . .
Id.
13
See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 649 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The factfinding
process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial factfinding. . . . [T]he usual
rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials,
such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath,
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rights, securities regulations, consumer protection, or antitrust law
arise, if an arbitrator gets it wrong on the law, there is no recourse for
the aggrieved party. The grounds provided for review of an award
under the FAA do not permit a court to review the award on the merits, but only allow review as to matters of fairness and arbitrator misconduct. The risk of having statutory claims decided by arbitrators is
that the careful protections Congress included in these statutes will
be undermined if parties are not allowed sufficient discovery and if
14
there is no possibility for review on points of law. Yet Congress has
not focused on how this Supreme Court policy of moving statutory
claims into arbitration impacts these legislative protections.
Deferring to the courts is unreasonable when the courts are interpreting the FAA in a manner inconsistent with both the text and
15
the purpose of the statute. Moreover, when the Supreme Court follows its own path, instead of construing the statute consistent with the
16
will of Congress, it risks engaging in unconstitutional lawmaking.

are often severely limited or unavailable.”) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57–58 (1974)).
14
According to Professor Stephen Ware, lack of any review of an arbitration
award by a court for an error of law means that the law has been “privatized” in the
sense that parties who arbitrate have contracted out of the law because they have
consented to the arbitration award regardless of whether it was correct on the law.
Stephen Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration,
83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 711–12 (1999). Thus, arbitration of a claim arising under a
mandatory law, such as antitrust, essentially permits parties to contract out of the law,
rendering the law a default provision rather than a mandatory one. Id. at 705–07.
Professor Ware argues that claims under mandatory rules should either be found to
be inarbitrable, or, because mandatory rules trump freedom of contract, courts
should review for errors of law any awards based on claims under mandatory rules.
Id. at 733–39.
15
See, e.g., Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 36 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(describing the decision as “unfaithful to congressional intent, unnecessary, and . . .
inexplicable. [It is an] exercise in judicial revisionism [that] goes too far. “); see also
Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 674 (1996) (arguing that the Court’s
FAA jurisprudence is inconsistent with the legislative history and that “the Court’s
preference for arbitration over litigation, its conclusion that the FAA preempts all
protective state legislation, and its assurance that arbitration is just as fair a forum as
litigation for resolution of legal complaints are myths that the Court has expounded
since 1983”).
16
See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 99 (2005) (“[I]nterpretation of a statute
that tends to implement the legislator’s will helps to implement the public’s will and
is therefore consistent with the Constitution’s democratic purpose. . . .
[I]nterpretation that undercuts the statute’s objectives tends to undercut that constitutional objective.”); Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons
from Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 962
(2007) (“[A]n overt effort to substitute an interpreter’s sense of what the statute
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The Court’s refusal to cooperate with the legislative commands of the
FAA is evident in the Court’s interpretive methodology in the case of
17
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., and in its earlier decision
18
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
This Article focuses on these two decisions in order to bring together several concerns about arbitration law. First, the Supreme
Court has construed the FAA in a way that either undervalues or ignores both the text and the legislative history, and therefore Congress’s statutory commands; this is demonstrated most recently by the
Court’s decision in Hall Street. Moreover, the Court’s construction of
the FAA, particularly in its decision in Mitsubishi that mandatory rules
of law can be arbitrated, has undercut the protections Congress has
adopted in the areas of civil rights, securities, consumer protection,
antitrust, and employment. Arbitrators’ rulings on mandatory rules
of law have been largely unreviewable on the merits, and after Hall
Street, appear absolutely unreviewable on the merits. The Court’s result-oriented methodology has developed arbitration law in a direction unanticipated by the text or legislative history of the statute. The
determination that arbitrator-citizens can enforce—or not enforce—
Congress’s regulatory laws without judicial review should prompt
Congress to take a close look at how arbitration law is impacting not
only individuals but also the entire justice system.
In both Hall Street and Mitsubishi, the Court had to interpret the
FAA with respect to a situation about which the statute was silent;
19
there was simply no statutory language that was plainly applicable.
In Hall Street, the question was whether the parties’ agreement to
have their award reviewed by a court for errors of fact or law was en20
forceable under the FAA. Resolving a split in the federal circuit
courts, the Supreme Court held that parties cannot contract around
the narrow grounds provided in the FAA for confirming, vacating, or
21
modifying an arbitration award. According to the Court, the statu22
tory grounds are mandatory and exclusive. The Court thus resolved
the conflict by determining that in the absence of text dealing specif-

ought to mean for the meaning that the legislature intended to convey is an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power . . . .”).
17
128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
18
473 U.S. 614 (1985).
19
Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403–04; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 623–29.
20
Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1400.
21
Id. at 1404.
22
Id.
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ically with the situation, the FAA prohibited access to the courts for
23
expanded judicial review, even though agreed to by the parties.
In Hall Street, the Court focused primarily on the text of the FAA,
holding that because the text did not specifically provide for judicial
24
review based on party agreement, no such review was allowed. In
Mitsubishi, by contrast, the Court interpreted the silence of the statute
to reach a very different conclusion. In that case, the Court found
that because the text of the FAA said nothing about statutory claims,
25
a presumption existed in favor of such claims. In doing so, the
Court vastly expanded the scope of the FAA by holding that antitrust
26
claims were arbitrable. As will be discussed below, in both cases, the
decisions do not seriously engage the text or the legislative history
and thus suggest that the Court has created its own arbitration law,
independent of the history, purpose, or text of the statute that Congress enacted.
Taken together, the two cases show the Supreme Court moving
arbitration law in a direction not only against the purposes of the
FAA, but also against the interests of those individuals that Congress
intended to protect by adopting laws to prevent abuses of civil rights,
consumer rights, monopolies, and securities fraud. As many commentators and courts have noted, rights may not be as well protected
27
in arbitration as in court. Nonetheless, the Court has not only expanded the scope of the FAA to make claims under such statutes arbitrable, but also, in Hall Street, has narrowed defenses to enforce28
ment of awards under those statutes. As will be discussed below, in
Hall Street, the Court not only denied parties the right to seek court
review of the merits of an arbitrator’s award, but also eliminated the
safety valve used by some courts when arbitrators made egregious er23

Id.
See id. at 1404–05.
25
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 623–29
(1985).
26
See id. at 628–29.
27
See, e.g., id. at 649 n.14; Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198,
203 (1955); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1360 (arguing that informal processes increase the risk of class-based discrimination); Elizabeth A. Roma,
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts and the Need for Meaningful Judicial
Review, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 519, 520 (2004) (“Unfortunately, the very
features that attract parties to ADR undermine the protection of an individual’s statutory rights. Because ADR is less formal and is not held to the same standards as
judicial proceedings, there is a risk that laws may be misapplied, or not applied at all,
and that justice will be exchanged for efficiency.”).
28
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404–05 (2008).
24
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rors of law, i.e., the vacatur of an arbitral award on the grounds of
29
manifest disregard of the law. This elimination of all possible judicial review for errors of law, combined with the large scale delegation
to private citizen-arbitrators to make decisions on the law that are
confidential and unreviewable on the merits, has vastly changed the
landscape of the justice system. Congressional action is needed.
In Part II, this Article will consider the Court’s decision in Hall
Street that the text of the FAA does not permit expanded judicial review. Part III will focus on a comparison with the Court’s very different interpretive approach to the statutory text in Mitsubishi, when it
expanded the scope of the FAA to reach statutory claims. The comparison of the two cases demonstrates that the Supreme Court has
applied its interpretive methodology in ways that minimize, if not
eliminate, its obligation to construe the FAA in a manner consistent
with the text and purpose of the statute. Finally, Part IV will consider
the negative impact of these two cases on regulatory laws adopted by
Congress and will discuss the need for Congress to take back legislative control of arbitration policy. It will then propose some alternatives that Congress should consider for dealing with the arbitration of
statutory claims.
II. HALL STREET AND EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. The Background of Expanded Judicial Review
The underlying problem prompting some parties to agree to
seek expanded judicial review of arbitral awards was the fear that a
maverick arbitrator might render an award that was unquestionably
30
wrong yet could not be vacated. The narrow grounds specifically set
forth in the FAA for vacating or modifying an award permit judicial
review only for reasons that go to the integrity of the process, such as
if a party was not permitted to present its case, if the arbitrator ex31
ceeded his powers, or if there was fraud or corruption. The statute
does not provide for review based on an arbitrator’s error of law or
fact.

29

Id.; see also infra note 122.
For examples of parties’ concerns about irrational awards, see Christopher
Drahozal, Standards for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards in the United States: Mandatory
Rules or Default Rules?, 16-9 MEALEY’S INT’L. ARB. REP. 27, 28 (2001); Stephen A.
Hochman, Judicial Review to Correct Error – An Option to Consider, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 103, 104 (1997); Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 241, 248–53 (1999).
31
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).
30
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Arbitration is a creature of consent; therefore, a few parties who
had concerns about arbitrator errors that could not otherwise be remedied began drafting arbitration clauses in which they agreed that
the arbitrator’s award would be subject to judicial review on the me32
33
rits. A number of circuit courts enforced these agreements. These
courts emphasized freedom of contract, reasoning that under the
FAA, the specific terms of the parties’ private agreement to arbitrate
must be enforced. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
noted, “Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration
34
agreements as they see fit.” Thus, courts supporting expanded judicial review found that the FAA grounds were default provisions and
35
that parties could draft around them. In addition, these courts also
took note that “enforcing the arbitration agreement—even with enhanced judicial review—will consume far fewer judicial resources
36
than if the case were given plenary adjudication.”
Moreover, these courts believed that enforcing agreements for
expanded judicial review served an important policy under the FAA,
which was that courts should enforce an arbitration agreement ac37
cording to its terms. In other words, these courts reinforced the voluntary consensual underpinning of arbitration. This was consistent
with the widespread view that arbitration offered the important ad32
Only a small number of parties appear to have actually entered into agreements for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards. See Reply Brief of PetitionerAppellant at 18, Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008) (No.
06-989) (“[A]lthough the Fifth Circuit has permitted expanded judicial review provisions since 1995, Hall Street has been able to identify only three written district court
decisions from that circuit in which a court applied such a provision in reviewing an
arbitration award.”) (footnote omitted).
33
Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403 n.5 (“The First, Third, Fifth and Sixth Circuits,
meanwhile, have held that parties may so contract. . . . The Fourth Circuit has taken
[this] side of the [circuit] split in an unpublished opinion . . . .”) (citing P.R. Tel. Co.
v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2005); Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v.
Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2005); Roadway Package Sys.,
Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 288 (3d Cir. 2001); Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, 120
F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993,
997 (5th Cir. 1995)).
34
Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996 (quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)).
35
See sources cited supra note 33.
36
LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring), vacated sub nom., Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade
Servs., Inc. 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
37
See id. at 888 (majority opinion) (“[T]he primary purpose of the FAA is to ensure enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate, in accordance with the agreements’ terms”).
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vantage of permitting parties to tailor the process to suit their partic38
ular needs.
Other courts, however, refused to enforce party agreements for
judicial review of an award on the merits. The U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits concluded that the narrow grounds
set forth in the FAA are mandatory and exclusive, and that a partydetermined expansion of judicial review was impermissible and con39
flicted with the policies of the FAA. Those policies, according to the
Tenth Circuit, supported the independence of arbitration from inter40
ference by the court. The two circuit courts also found that parties
have no power to go beyond the statute and to require additional re41
view by the court.
The Ninth Circuit noted, for example:
“[B]ecause Congress has specified standards for confirming an arbitration award, federal courts must act pursuant to those standards
and not others. . . . [P]rivate parties lack the power to dictate how the
42
federal courts conduct the business of resolving disputes.”
The differences between the two positions were stark. The first
position was that party agreements for judicial review of an award on
the merits were enforceable because the FAA’s narrow grounds were
default rules that would apply only if the parties did not agree other43
wise. Moreover, the first position viewed expanded judicial review as
fully consonant with the FAA’s goal of enforcing parties’ agreements
44
according to their terms. The second position was that expanded
judicial review was in conflict with the FAA because it would create
new obligations for the courts, which therefore would interfere with
45
the independence of the arbitral process. Thus, FAA grounds were
mandatory and exclusive, and parties could not contract around

38
See, e.g., id. (“Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion,
and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.
Just as [parties] may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may
they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.”
(quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478–79 (1989)) .
39
See Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d 987; Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925,
936–37 (10th Cir. 2001).
40
See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935–36.
41
See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 1000; Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936.
42
Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 1000.
43
See sources cited supra note 33.
44
See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated, Kyocera, 341 F.3d 987.
45
See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935–36.
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them. In March 2008, in Hall Street, the Supreme Court held that the
46
grounds in the FAA were mandatory and exclusive.
B. The Hall Street Decision
1.

The Lower Court Decisions

The Hall Street arbitration award occurred in a rather unusual
context. In the midst of a federal lawsuit over obligations under a
lease, the parties decided that one issue—the question of Mattel’s obligation to indemnify the landlord, Hall Street, for clean-up costs of
47
environmental damage—would be submitted to arbitration.
The
parties then entered into an arbitration agreement providing that any
arbitration award would be reviewed by the district court for errors of
48
fact or law.
The district court approved the agreement and entered it as an
49
order. After the arbitrator rendered an award in favor of Mattel, the
district court, in accordance with the review permitted under the par50
ties’ agreement, vacated it for an error of law. On remand, the arbi51
trator ruled in favor of Hall Street. This time, the district court
52
upheld the award. The Ninth Circuit reversed, however, on the
grounds that the terms of the arbitration agreement providing for
judicial review of the merits of the award were “unenforceable and
53
severable.”
46

See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct 1396, 1406–08 (2008). The
Court specifically did not decide, and remanded to the Ninth Circuit to determine,
whether grounds outside the FAA, based on state statutory or common law, or on
rules of the federal district court, could provide additional grounds for review. Id. at
1407–08.
47
Id. at 1400.
48
The arbitration agreement provided in pertinent part: “The Court shall vacate,
modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator’s findings of facts are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are
erroneous.” Id. at 1400–01.
49
Id. at 1400.
50
Id. at 1401.
51
Id.
52
Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1401.
53
Id. After the Ninth Circuit’s reversal, the district court again decided in favor
of Hall Street on different grounds, and the Ninth Circuit reversed again, after which
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. At the time the parties in Hall Street entered into their arbitration agreement, the Ninth Circuit had determined that
agreements for expanded judicial review were enforceable. See LaPine Tech. Corp. v.
Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 890–91 (1997). The court flip-flopped later in an en
banc decision, Kyocera v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (2003),
so that by the time the parties in Hall Street appealed to the Ninth Circuit, Kyocera had
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In holding that the FAA’s grounds for review of an award were
mandatory and exclusive, the Supreme Court denied the parties any
access to the courts for review on the merits. Writing for the majority, Justice Souter gave a brief mention of a policy justification, stating
that expanded judicial review would “rende[r] informal arbitration
merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judi54
cial review process.” In other words, access to the courts for review
on the merits would produce a less-efficient process. The Court gave
no consideration to any of the policy reasons in favor of expanded
judicial review, such as party autonomy, freedom of contract, and the
driving purpose behind the FAA “of ensuring that private arbitration
55
agreements are enforced according to their terms.” Though it acknowledged that “the FAA lets parties tailor some, even many fea56
tures of arbitration by contract,” the Court said nothing about arbitration’s core premise of being consensual. Nor did it acknowledge,
as the Tenth Circuit did, that expanded judicial review is still less of a
burden on the courts than if the parties chose to litigate in the first
57
instance.
The Court also failed to consider that even in jurisdictions where
expanded judicial review was available, few parties had availed them58
selves of it. The vast majority preferred traditional arbitration. But
for parties who wanted a safety net, the Court’s decision denied them
the choice of court review to ensure that their dispute was not resolved by an award that rested on an erroneous conclusion of law.
b.

Legislative History

In addition to briefly mentioning efficiency as a reason for its
decision, the Court, in a footnote, also gave a passing nod to the legis-

overruled LaPine, making an agreement to review an arbitration award on the merits
unenforceable in the Ninth Circuit.
54
Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1405 (quoting Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998).
55
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478 (1989).
56
Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404.
57
See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 n.6 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We
recognize, of course, that even under expanded standards of review, arbitration reduces the burden on district courts.”)
58
See Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 32, at 18.
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59

lative history of the FAA. It asserted that its decision was consistent
with legislative history, citing testimony before the congressional subcommittees in 1924 that referred only to the specific grounds that are
60
contained in the statute.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that the Court’s ruling not
only conflicted with the core purpose of the FAA, but also ignored
61
the historical context in which the Act was passed.
Before 1925, courts routinely refused to specifically enforce an
arbitration agreement, although they would enforce arbitration
62
awards. A party to an arbitration agreement could simply refuse to
63
arbitrate with no adverse consequences. Although refusing to arbitrate was a breach of contract, it was difficult, if not impossible, to
64
prove damages. The FAA was enacted to require specific enforce65
ment of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate. According to Justice
Stevens, because the principal purpose of the FAA was to “ensur[e]
that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their
66
terms,” this purpose mandates “giv[ing] effect to parties’ fairly negotiated decisions to provide for judicial review of arbitration awards
67
for errors of law.”
It is unlikely that it ever occurred to Congress or the drafters of
the Act in 1924 that a party would want expanded judicial review, be68
cause courts were viewed as unsupportive of arbitration at the time.
The drafters and proponents of the Act simply argued that the law

59

Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1406 n.7. Justice Scalia, who joined in the opinion, did
not join in this footnote. Id. at 1400 n.*.
60
See id. at 1406.
61
See id. at 1408 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62
See id.
63
See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924) (noting that the arbitration agreement “was
subject to revocation by either of the parties at any time before the award” and that
this rendered the agreements “ineffectual” because “the party aggrieved by the refusal of the other party to carry out the arbitration agreement was without adequate remedy.”).
64
See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 20 (1992); WESLEY A. STURGES,
A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 255–62 (1930).
65
Hall St., 128 S. Ct at 1408 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[9 U.S.C. §2], which is the
centerpiece of the FAA, reflects Congress’ main goal in passing the legislation: ‘to
abrogate the general common-law rule against specific enforcement of arbitration
agreements.’”) (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
66
Id. (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
67
Id.
68
Id.; S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924).
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69

was necessary in order for arbitration agreements to be enforced.
The narrow grounds for review served to prevent courts from interfering with the parties’ choice to have an arbitrator, rather than a
70
court, decide the dispute. The focus was on restraining the courts,
71
which were believed to be hostile to arbitration. There was no discussion of whether, if the parties themselves wanted more help from
the court, they could agree on a more comprehensive review of the
award. At that point in time, the drafters and proponents of the Act
were simply eager to have legislation that would cause the courts to
overcome their objections to arbitration, enforce the agreement to
arbitrate, then step back and let the arbitrator decide the dispute.
The Court’s refusal to consider seriously the legislative history
and purpose of the Act no doubt reflects the influence of Justice Scalia and other “textualists,” who have asserted that to the extent that
any legislative intent is pertinent, that intent is found in the text of
72
the statute, and that legislative history is irrelevant. Textualists express concern that a purpose-driven focus on legislative history permits too much judicial leeway, so that judges can look for and find
73
support for any policy preferences they may have. Although some
textualists will agree that the context of language matters, to them
the “context” only includes dictionary definitions, textual canons,
points of grammar, and use of the same language in another part of
74
the same statute or in a different statute. In the textualists’ view,

69
See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 34–35 (brief of Julius Cohen, the principal
drafter of the FAA); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2.
70
See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 36 (because the grounds to vacate, modify, or
correct the award are narrow, “[t]here is no authority and no opportunity for the
court, in connection with the award, to inject its own ideas of what the award should
have been”)
71
See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 39.
72
See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 29–37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
73
See id. at 17–18 (“[U]nder the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires . . . .”); see also Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting
her colleague Judge Leventhal’s observation that citing legislative history is akin to
“looking over a crowd and picking out your friends”).
74
See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 44
(2006) (“[T]extualists . . . place heavy emphasis on dictionary definitions, the use of
identical language in other statutory provisions, and ‘textual’ or ‘linguistic’ canons of
construction that have nothing to do with statutory purposes or societal effects.”)
According to Justice Scalia, these interpretive aids are indicia of “‘objectified’ intent,”
which he views as “the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of
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legislative history has no value because Congress can have no ascertainable group “intent.” From the textualists’ perspective, the various
members of Congress frequently have very little knowledge about the
particular legislation, or have different preferences, priorities, or
75
views of the legislation’s purpose. Moreover, the textualists raise an
interest-group critique asserting the unreliability of legislative reports
and drafting history because of manipulation by partisan partici76
pants.
Increasingly, however, there is scholarly and judicial support for
a larger view of “context,” one that includes the historical context of
the statute and that considers legislative history a part of the constitutional process deserving of consideration in the interpretation of any
77
statute. Both analytical philosophy and political science have contributed to our understanding of the validity of the collective intent
78
of Congress, and political science scholarship is undercutting the
the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.” Scalia, supra note 72, at
17.
75
See Molot, supra note 74, at 28 (“[B]orrowing heavily from public choice
theory, textualists emphasized that the legislative process is messy and full of compromises, some principled and some unprincipled.”).
76
See Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptionalization of Legislative History in the Supreme
Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 215–16 (explaining that textualism “drew upon the Chicago School of public choice theory to show that Congress, as a diverse body of nonaggregable preferences, could not have a determinable group intent other than the
formal one of enacted text”).
77
See BREYER, supra note 16, at 99 (“[A]n interpretation of a statute that tends to
implement the legislator’s will helps to implement the public’s will and is therefore
consistent with the Constitution’s democratic purpose.”); Paul E. McGreal, A Constitutional Defense of Legislative History, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1267, 1299 (2005)
(“Because legislative history reflects the context of bicameralism and presentment, it
provides the constitutionally preferred context for determining statutory meaning.”).
78
See Tiefer, supra note 76, at 260–63.
[W]hen the kind of speech [legislators] produce is a statute, i.e., a sovereign command uttered by an institutional process, then, as in all
such commands, the form of speech itself implies an aim. If the
speech is uttered by an institution, then the aim is an institutional aim
devised as a collective intent. . . .
....
Importantly, procedural stages—like moving a legislative bill out of
committee, passing the bill in one chamber, [or] reporting from conference . . . create ‘conditional rights. . . .’
. . . Procedural stages and conditional rights serve as the means for
institutions to express intent. None of this depends upon a group
mind, or upon all members of the institution having a subjective
awareness of all these aspects.
Id.; see also James J. Brudney, Intentionalism’s Revival, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1001, 1002
(2007) (“Advocates for an intentionalist approach have applied lessons from political
science, democratic constitutionalism, analytic philosophy, and developmental psy-
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textualists’ assertions, derived from public choice theory, that legislative history cannot be relied upon because it is based on compromise
79
and opportunistic activity. Theories of communication focus on statutory interpretation as “a constitutionally legitimate decoding of sta80
tutory commands,” and find that an understanding of legislative
history is necessary for a judge to be able to decode statutes accurate81
ly.
Moreover, recent empirical research suggests that the liberal justices, the ones most likely to rely on legislative history, do not appear
82
to do so in order to promote their preferred policy outcomes. A
study focused on workplace lawsuits found that liberal justices used
legislative history to help support pro-employer outcomes slightly
83
more often than they did to justify pro-employee results. Contrary
to the textualists’ view of legislative history as maximizing judicial
leeway, the authors of this study concluded:
The liberals’ regular and nuanced reliance on legislative history
reflects their belief that history can help illuminate the dimensions and details of complex legislative deals. More important,
these Justices’ willingness to follow a legislative history trail leading away from their preferred policy perspectives indicates the
84
principled nature of their interpretive approach.

Nonetheless, despite studies and scholarly commentary indicating that legislative history remains an important interpretive tool, in
Hall Street, the Justices gave it very short shrift.

chology to help justify the existence and importance of a collective legislative purpose that can illuminate statutory meaning under the right conditions.”) (footnotes
omitted).
79
See Tiefer, supra note 76, at 267–68 (stating that political science researchers
“cast doubt on the existence of a level of interest group distortion sufficient to make
legislative history generally misleading and unhelpful” and “found voting in most
congressional committees did not nearly diverge from voting in full chambers to the
extent the interest group critique might suggest”). Political scientists “have worked
out new theories of the institutional role of committees that downplay concerns
about extreme strategic distortion argued by the special interest critique.” Id. at 268.
80
Boudreau et al., supra note 16, at 959. While cautioning that “not all legislative
history is created equal,” the authors point out that when judges are privy to the legislative process, they “understand better the way that legislators compress statutory
meaning and the way that they (the judges) should expand it.” Id. at 973.
81
See id. at 973.
82
See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 154
(2008).
83
See id. at 153–54.
84
Id. at 160.
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c.

The Statutory Text

In Hall Street, although the Court briefly expressed a concern
about efficiency and noted its belief that its decision was consistent
with legislative history, the core rationale for its decision rested on
85
the text of the statute, or, more precisely, the absence of text. Essentially, the Court determined that since the statute does not specifically provide that the parties can agree on other grounds for judicial
86
review, the narrow statutory grounds are therefore exclusive. According to the Court, even if the text of sections 10 and 11 of the FAA
could be “supplemented to some extent, it would stretch basic interpretive principles to expand the stated grounds to the point of evi87
dentiary and legal review generally.” The Court then pulled out the
88
rule of ejusdem generis, for an “implicit lesson.” This canon of construction is a short-hand way of saying that when several specific items
are followed by a general item, the general item should be inter89
preted as being in the same category as the specific items. If, for ex-

85

Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404–05 (2008).
Id. at 1404.
87
Id. The pertinent grounds for vacating an award in section 10 include the following:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006). Under section 10, “[i]f an award is vacated and the time
within which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired, the
court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.” Id. § 10(b). The
pertinent grounds for modifying or correcting an award in section 11 include the
following:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an
evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or
property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted
to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision
upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the
merits of the controversy.
Id. § 11.
88
Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404.
89
Id.
86
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ample, there is a bill of sale for a farm that includes “cattle, hogs, and
other animals,” the “other animals” would probably be interpreted as
including other farm animals but not the pet puppy of the farmer’s
90
child. In sections 10 and 11, however, there is no general term that
91
follows the several specific terms, so there is no reason for ejusdem
generis to apply. But the Court’s “implicit lesson” is that, because a
general term—if one existed—would be linked to the earlier specific
terms, when there is no term at all, there can be “no textual hook for
92
expansion.”
The Court’s “implicit lesson” is simply wrong because it is based
on a false use of the canon. The application of ejusdem generis cannot
legitimately be twisted into a means of creating a prohibition not
found in the statute. When there is no prohibition in the text, the
Court should look to the legislative history, the context of the statute,
and any pertinent public policy to ascertain if there is any reason to
93
have such a prohibition.
Moreover, the text itself provides a basis for supporting party autonomy. Section 10(a)(4) states that an award may be vacated “where
94
the arbitrators exceeded their powers.” The powers of arbitrators
95
derive from the consent of the parties. Thus, the text of section
10(a)(4) implies that Congress intended the parties to be able to determine the nature and extent of arbitrator power, which could reasonably include curtailing that power by making it subject to judicial
90
Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 833, 853 (1964).
91
See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1405.
92
Id. at 1404.
93
Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that “[a] decision ‘not to regulate’ the terms
of an agreement that does not even arguably offend any public policy whatsoever, ‘is
adequately justified by a presumption in favor of freedom.’” Id. at 1409–10 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 320 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
94
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006).
95
See MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2 (2008) (“The parties’ consent provides the underpinning for the power of the arbitrators to decide the dispute. The parties’ consent also
limits an arbitrator’s power because an arbitrator can only decide issues within the
scope of the parties’ agreement.”); Edward Brunet, The Core Values of Arbitration, in
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 3, 3 (2006) (“Arbitration rests
on a firm foundation of party autonomy. The parties own the dispute, and should be
able to control the details of their disputing process.”) (citation omitted); see also Gateway Techs, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally
free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.”) (quoting Mastrobuono
v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)).
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96

review on the merits. Certainly, nothing in the statutory language
contradicts this interpretation, and it reflects a more reasonable interpretation of the text than does the far-fetched and false application of ejusdem generis.
The Court has gone off track in its interpretive principles by essentially ignoring the legislative history and context of the statute. A
number of scholars have asserted that although textualists claim that
their objection to legislative history is that it permits judges to manipulate meaning, textualists themselves, by ignoring the historical context of the statute, can and do engage in greater manipulation of
97
meaning to accord with their values. A textualist judge may “confuse his own idiosyncratic reading of the statutory text with the clear
meaning that a reasonable reader or legislator would assign to that
98
text.” In doing so, the judge is exacerbating, rather than eliminating, the problem of judicial leeway.
The interpretation of the FAA in Hall Street is an example of the
Court being led astray by an overemphasis on textualism, including
an inaccurate and improper resort to a canon of interpretation. The
purpose of the FAA was to require courts to enforce arbitration
99
agreements and to limit their interference with the process. All of
the narrow grounds of sections 10 and 11 pertain to the limited areas
where courts would be authorized to interfere because the integrity
of the process had been undermined by the arbitrator’s conduct or
100
because mistakes of form had occurred. The absence of a general
96

See Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 73 (1999) (“Congress would not have granted such express
authority [in section 10(a)(4)] unless it intended some ability of the arbitral signatories to shape the nature of arbitration and judicial review.”).
97
See, e.g., Molot, supra, note 74, at 49, 54.
If . . . modern textualists . . . place too much emphasis on statutory text
as a means of cabining judicial leeway, they . . . run the risk that they . .
. will render judges less, rather than more, faithful to Congress’s instructions.
....
. . . The more often judges exclude statutory purposes, and try to
resolve (or eliminate) statutory ambiguity using textualist tools alone,
the more likely it is that legislators’ purposes will be frustrated.
Id.
98
Id. at 53.
99
Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 225,
231 (1997). The purpose of the limited review provisions of section 10 is “to insulate
[awards] from parochial or intrusive judicial review” so that parties “need not fear an
officious or meddlesome inquiry into the merits which would impair the efficacy of
the arbitral process for them.” Id.
100
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10–11 (2006).
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term pertaining to grounds for judicial review at the end of the list of
specific grounds in sections 10 and 11 does not mean that the statute
has anything at all to say about party agreements on judicial review.
Sections 10 and 11 impose a limit on what courts can do under the sta101
tute. They do not, however, limit what parties can agree to. Ejusdem
generis cannot be stretched to restrict what parties can agree to when
the statutory text does not deal at all with party agreements. By twisting the use of ejusdem generis, and also by divorcing the text from the
context and meaning of the statute at the time of its enactment, the
Court has simply manipulated the text to reach the result it pre102
ferred: restricting parties’ access to the courts.
d. The Elimination of “Manifest Disregard”
In addition to interpreting the statute to prohibit parties from
agreeing to expanded judicial review, the Court also appeared to
eliminate the judicially created ground for review known as “manifest
103
“Manifest disregard” has been applied by
disregard” of the law.
104
every federal circuit court and the Supreme Court has occasionally
105
Courts have
referred to it when reviewing an arbitration award.
generally understood “manifest disregard” to mean that a court can
vacate an award if an arbitrator knew what the law was but neverthe106
less disregarded it.
The courts probably created the doctrine because of an instinctive resistance to letting stand an award that was
based on an egregious error of the law. Many courts have cited as au107
thority the 1953 Supreme Court case of Wilko v. Swan. In that case,
the Court said in dicta that “[i]n unrestricted submissions . . . the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators, in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error
101

See id.
Some commentators have criticized the use of canons of construction for any
purpose. For example, Richard Posner opined that canons of construction “no more
enable difficult questions of interpretation to be answered than the maxims of everyday life enable the difficult problems of everyday living to be solved.” RICHARD
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 280 (1990). Professor Alan Scott Rau has
specifically criticized the Hall Street decision for its “grotesque deficiencies in
craftsmanship, in rhetoric, in argument,” and as “ represent[ing] a new low in context-free, policy-free, abstract, non-functional decision-making.” Alan Scott Rau, Fear
of Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 469, 482, 485 (2008).
103
See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953).
104
See Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard, 8 NEV. L.J. 234, 234
(2007).
105
See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc., v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
106
See Drahozal, supra note 104, at 234, 235–36.
107
346 U.S. 427.
102
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in interpretation.” In other words, if the arbitrator made an error
of law, this would not be a ground for review unless the arbitrator’s
interpretation was so extreme as to amount to a manifest disregard of
the law. In that case, such disregard of the law could result in vacatur
109
of the award.
Hall Street presented the Court with a “manifest disregard” argument: because judges had created “manifest disregard” as a
ground for vacating an award that was not in the text of the FAA, the
110
limited grounds of the statutory text were not exclusive.
The
Court’s response was that “Hall Street overlooks the fact that the
statement it relies on [from Wilko] expressly rejects just what Hall
111
Street asks for here, general review for an arbitrator’s legal errors.”
This response is not on point because it ignores the thrust of Hall
Street’s argument. Hall Street never asserted that either the FAA or
Wilko had provided for “general review of an arbitrator’s legal er112
rors.”
Rather, its position was simply that a widely used judicially
created ground for review undermines the position that the express
113
statutory grounds are exclusive.
Although the Court never responded directly to that argument,
its opinion in Hall Street nonetheless appears to have eliminated “manifest disregard” as a separate ground for review of an award. The
Court suggested that the Wilko dicta was “vague[]” and might have
merely been a reference “to the [section] 10 grounds collectively, ra114
ther than an addition to them.” This was somewhat surprising be115
cause in 1995, in First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, the Court, citing
Wilko favorably in dicta, appeared to accept “manifest disregard” as a
ground for vacating an award, stating:
The party still can ask a court to review the arbitrator’s decision,
but the court will set that decision aside only in very unusual circumstances. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10 (award procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; arbitrator exceeded his powers);
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37, 98 L. Ed. 168, 74 S. Ct. 182
108

Id. at 436–37 (emphasis added).
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008).
110
Id.
111
Id. at 1404.
112
See id.
113
The Court mentioned in passing that a “supposed judicial expansion by interpretation” might be different from a “private expansion by contract,” but still did not
respond to Hall Street’s position concerning the nonexclusive character of the statutory grounds for review. See id.
114
See id. at 1404.
115
514 U.S. 938.
109
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(1953) (parties bound by arbitrator’s decision not in “manifest
disregard” of the law), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 104 L. Ed. 2d 526,
116
109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).

Thus, in Wilko and First Options the Court acknowledged that
courts may set aside an arbitral award either under one of the
grounds listed in the section 10 of the FAA, or because the arbitrator
117
acted in “manifest disregard” of the law. Nonetheless, in Hall Street,
the Court backpedaled, declaring that “[m]aybe the term ‘manifest
disregard’ was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it
merely referred to the [section] 10 grounds collectively,” or, maybe it
118
was a “shorthand for [section] 10(a)(3) or [section] 10 (a)(4).”
The Court then asserted that “[w]e, speaking as a Court, have merely
119
taken the Wilko language as we found it, without embellishment.”
The Court’s final word, however, appears to be the nail in the coffin
of “manifest disregard.” “[N]ow that its meaning is implicated, we
120
see no reason to accord it the significance that Hall Street urges.”
The significance urged by Hall Street was that “manifest disregard”
was “a further ground for vacatur on top of those listed in [section]
121
10.”
Thus, the Court’s decision that it was not a further ground
appears to have eliminated “manifest disregard” as a separate ground
for vacating an arbitral award, although some lower courts have a dif122
ferent view.
116

Id. at 942.
See id.
118
128 S. Ct. at 1404.
119
Id. (citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 942).
120
Id.
121
Id. at 1403.
122
After Hall Street, a number of federal courts have held that the decision made
clear that manifest disregard of the law is not an independent basis on which to vacate an arbitration award. See, e.g., Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d
349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009); Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124
n.3 (1st Cir. 2008); Prime Therapeutics LLC v. Omnicare, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 993,
998–99 (D. Minn. 2008); T. Co. Metals LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., No. 077747, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112087, at *8 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2008); Ascension Orthopedics, Inc. v. Curasan, AG, No. 07-4033, 2008 WL 2074058, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May
14, 2008). Other federal courts take the position that Hall Street did not abrogate the
manifest disregard doctrine altogether because it remains as a judicial gloss on the
specific grounds for vacatur enumerated in section 10. See, e.g., Comedy Club, Inc. v.
Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1289–90 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 145
(2009); Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 93–95 (2nd Cir.
2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2793 (2009). The Sixth Circuit has taken various positions. See Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Bank of Okla., 304 F. App’x 360, 363–64
(6th Cir. 2008) (manifest disregard maintains validity, but may be judicial gloss on 9
U.S.C. § 10); Coffee Beanery Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 300 F. App’x 415, 421 (6th Cir. 2008)
117
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To the extent that it has eliminated “manifest disregard,” the
Court has removed a safety net, albeit a narrow one. Arbitrating parties appear to have no right to any review of an arbitral award that
rests on an arbitrator’s deliberate, erroneous conclusion of law. Such
a result can impact not only our system of justice, but also how parties
perceive the functioning of arbitration within that system. The absence of any possible review is particularly significant in light of the
Supreme Court’s delegation to private citizen-arbitrators of the judicial power to decide claims under regulatory statutes.
III. THE MITSUBISHI DECISION
A. Interpretive Methodology
It is instructive to compare the interpretive methodology in Hall
Street with the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Mitsubishi, which
123
held that antitrust claims were arbitrable under the FAA.
In Hall
Street, the Court twisted a canon of construction to claim that the absence of any mention of additional grounds for review in the FAA

(award vacated because arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 81 (2009); Dealer Computer Servs., Inc. v. Dub Herring Ford, 547 F.3d
558, 561 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding manifest disregard to be a non-statutory
ground for vacatur, but providing a “but see” cite to Hall Street). In October 2009,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in three cases that specifically raised the issue
of whether “manifest disregard” was a valid ground for vacatur under the FAA. See
Improv W. Assocs. v. Comedy Club, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 145 (2009); Grain v. Trinity
Health, 130 S. Ct. 96 (2009); Coffee Beanery Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 130 S. Ct. 81 (2009).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2793 (2009). Although the question presented in StoltNielsen was whether, under the FAA, a class action can be imposed on parties whose
arbitration clauses are silent on that issue, the Court may well deal with the question
of manifest disregard because it was a basis for the district court’s vacatur of an arbitral award. See Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). It was reversed by the Second Circuit, Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 102,
which nonetheless contended that the manifest disregard doctrine survived in limited form. Id. at 93–95. Thus, the Supreme Court may soon give further guidance
as to the doctrine of manifest disregard.
State courts as well, in applying the FAA, have adopted one of the two positions.
One position is that, post-Hall Street, manifest disregard of the law “is no longer an
independent and proper basis under the Federal Arbitration Act for vacating, modifying, or correcting an arbitrator’s award.” Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 13 So. 3d
375, 381 (Ala. 2009); see also Horton Homes, Inc. v. Shaner, 999 So. 2d 462, 467 n.2
(Ala. 2008). The second position is that the concept of “manifest disregard” is an
interpretive standard such that existing case law can be used to interpret section
10(a)(4) of the FAA. In re Johnson, 864 N.Y.S.2d 873, 886–87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008);
Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348–49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
123
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 619
(1985).
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constituted textual evidence that the grounds were prohibited. By
contrast, in Mitsubishi, the Court decided that the absence of any
mention in the FAA that statutory claims were covered constituted
125
textual evidence that such claims were not prohibited. According to
the Court, such unmentioned claims were included within the scope
126
of enforceable agreements to arbitrate.
In Mitsubishi, the dispute was between a Puerto Rican car dealership and Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, a Japanese corporation with
127
its principal place of business in Tokyo. The parties’ contract pro128
vided for arbitration in Japan. The Puerto Rican dealership raised
129
antitrust claims that it believed should be litigated. The Court held
that arbitrators in Japan could determine the antitrust claims under
130
U.S. law.
Mitsubishi was decided in 1985, before Justice Scalia joined the
131
Court and before his brand of textualism had great influence there.
Nonetheless, as in Hall Street, the Court in Mitsubishi did not pay se132
Neither the
rious attention to the legislative history of the FAA.
text of the statute nor the legislative history provides that the FAA was
intended to apply to statutory claims. The statutory text refers only to
contract claims and maritime transactions. The pertinent language
of section 2, which establishes the scope of the Act, states:

124
See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404–05, 1408. The
Court equated “no textual hook for expansion” with a statutory prohibition of expansion of grounds for review by party agreement, holding the stated statutory
grounds were exclusive. Id.
125
See 473 U.S. at 625–26.
126
See id.
127
Id. at 616–17.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 619.
130
Id. at 638–40.
131
See Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal
Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 823 (2002) (“In 1986, President Reagan appointed Justice Scalia to the Supreme Court. Since joining the Court, Justice Scalia has sought
to make a statute’s text the primary factor in statutory interpretation.”).
132
This is perhaps because the Court had earlier made a number of decisions
which ignored the legislative history. Thus, to bring forth a careful analysis of legislative history in Mitsubishi might risk disturbing precedents set in earlier cases. See, e.g.,
Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). As Justice O’Connor noted in her dissent in
Southland, the Court in that case, despite the facial silence of section 2 of the FAA,
interpreted the statute to apply in state as well as federal courts. Id. at 22–23
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s decision . . . utterly fails to recognized the
clear congressional intent underlying the FAA. Congress intended to require federal,
not state, courts to respect arbitration agreements.”)
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A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof . . .
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con133
tract.

Nothing in this language provides that the Act applies to statutory claims. The focus is on contract claims between merchants or maritime parties involved in commerce. The statute is silent as to statutory claims. To assert that the FAA applies to statutory claims, one
must resort to interpretive tools. One might, for example, argue
from the text that the language of section 2 focusing on “a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or the refusal
to perform the whole or any part thereof” could be interpreted to
mean a statutory claim that arises under or out of a contract. This
only becomes a plausible interpretation, however, if one ignores the
historical context of the enactment and centuries of arbitration practice. For over three hundred years, arbitration was understood to be
a way for disputes between merchants to be resolved among their
peers, who understood business requirements and mores, rather than
134
by judges, who were less informed about normal business practices.
A recent scholarly article has provided persuasive historical and textual evidence that the FAA is a direct descendent of the 1698 Arbitration Act, which was adopted by the English Parliament in order to
strengthen the autonomy of arbitration as a means for promoting the
135
economic interests of businesses, merchants, and traders. Like the
U.S. Congress of 1925, King William III and Parliament in 1698
wanted common law arbitrators to respond to merchants’ concerns
that their disputes be resolved quickly and efficiently by individuals
136
knowledgeable about business practices. The focus was on contract

133

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
See Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning the New King: The Statutory Arbitrator and the Demise of Judicial Review, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2–3, 21–22. LeRoy’s research revealed
that very few courts reviewed statutory arbitrations. Id. at 22–23. Such arbitrations
were a rare phenomenon. These unusual cases do not detract from the fact that until Mitsubishi, statutory claims were, with few exceptions (unknown to most people)
simply not arbitrated.
135
See id. at 15–16, 29–31. The author provides charts comparing the specific and
sometimes identical language used in the FAA and in the 1698 Arbitration Act, as
well as in William Blackstone’s Commentaries and other English treatises. See id. at
29, 31.
136
See id. at 4.
134

MOSES (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

ARBITRATION LAW: WHO’S IN CHARGE?

3/3/2010 12:29 PM

171

disputes; statutory claims were simply not part of arbitration prac137
tice.
As inheritors of this tradition, members of the 1925 Congress
indicated that arbitrators under the FAA would continue to decide
the same kinds of business and merchant disputes that had been arbi138
trated for centuries. Statutory claims were never mentioned in any
of the hearings before Congress or in the written materials submitted
139
The proponents of the Act
to the congressional subcommittees.
were businessmen and their lawyers who wanted arbitration clauses
between merchants to be enforced in federal court. Julius Cohen,
one of the primary drafters of the Act, co-wrote an article shortly after
the passage of the Act in which he explained the purpose and effect
140
of the Act to the legal community. Specifically, he noted that arbitration was “not the proper method for deciding points of law of major importance involving constitutional questions or policy in the ap141
plication of statutes.”
Rather, arbitration was well-suited to “the
questions of law which arise out of [the] daily relations between merchants as to the passage of title, the existence of warranties or [re142
lated] questions of law.” This was consistent with the position presented by the proponents in the congressional hearings, which was
that making arbitration agreements enforceable would enable mer143
chants to resolve their contract disputes cheaply and easily.
B. A Paradigm Shift
A major paradigmatic and unexpected shift in arbitration practice followed the Supreme Court’s 1985 holding in Mitsubishi that an137

See id. at 2–3, 21–22.
For example, the House Report accompanying the bill provided as follows:
Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of
the bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his agreement. He can no longer refuse to perform his contract when it becomes disadvantageous to him. An arbitration agreement is placed
upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
139
See generally Joint Hearings, supra note 1; Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. (1923); S. REP. NO. 68-536
(1924); H.R. REP. NO. 68-96.
140
Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REV. 265 (1926).
141
Id. at 281.
142
Id.
143
See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Charles Bernheimer, Chairman, Committee on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York).
138
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titrust claims could be arbitrated. The Court read the arbitration
clause as not only encompassing a claim of failure to perform the
contract, but also as including a claim of an independent violation of
144
federal law. Application of the FAA to independent violations of law
145
outside of a contract was a new concept, a concept created by the
Court and not supported by either the text or the legislative history of
146
the statute. Moreover, at the time the Court decided Mitsubishi, the
circuit courts that had been faced with the question of whether antitrust claims could be arbitrated had unanimously and unequivocally
147
answered “no.”
The lead case on this point, American Safety Equip148
ment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., provided four basic reasons why antitrust claims were not arbitrable. First, a claim under antitrust law is
149
not a mere private matter. A plaintiff asserting rights under the Act
is acting as a private attorney general to protect the public interest in
150
a competitive economy.
Second, alleged monopolists, who frequently engage in adhesion contracts with their customers, should
151
not be able to determine the forum for deciding an antitrust claim.
Third, because antitrust claims tend to be complex and fact-intensive,
the kinds of evidence needed to prove a case is better able to be ob152
tained and considered in a judicial forum than an arbitral one.
Fourth, commercial arbitrators tend to be drawn from the business
community and are likely to be focused on the issues between the
144

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–27
(1985).
145
Although Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), involved a claim of a
breach of contractual warranties as well as a claim that the breach amounted to fraud
under the securities laws, the Court in Mitsubishi considered for the first time “the
question whether a standard arbitration clause referring to claims arising out of or
relating to a contract should be construed to cover statutory claims that have only an
indirect relationship to the contract.” Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 646–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146
As Justice Stevens explained, in his dissent,
The plain language of this statute encompasses Soler’s claims that arise
out of its contract with Mitsubishi, but does not encompass a claim arising under federal law[] . . . . Nothing in the text of the 1925 Act, nor
its legislative history, suggests that Congress intended to authorize the
arbitration of any statutory claims.
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147
Id. at 656 (citing cases from the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits).
148
391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
149
Id. at 826.
150
Id.
151
See id. at 827.
152
See id.
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parties before them rather than on the public interest in those is153
sues.
Another factor that may well have influenced the circuit courts
was that Congress provided in the Sherman Act that antitrust claims
154
could only be decided in federal court, not in state court.
If the
courts of the sovereign states were not thought competent to decide
antitrust claims, it is not surprising that the lower courts did not view
155
arbitrators as having that competence.
Even though there was no evidence in the text of the statute or
the legislative history that the FAA applied to statutory claims, and
even though no lower court had ever found that antitrust claims were
arbitrable under the FAA, the Supreme Court had no difficulty con156
struing the FAA to cover the antitrust claims raised in Mitsubishi. It
did this in two steps. First, the Court emphasized a strong federal
157
policy in favor of arbitration.
Second, it focused on the antitrust
statute, asserting that if Congress had not intended the statute to be
158
arbitrated, it would have so indicated within the statute itself.
1.

Federal Policy as a Basis for the Shift

With respect to the strong federal policy, the Court stated that
“the congressional policy manifested in the Federal Arbitration
Act . . . requires courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration

153

See id.
See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006); Gen. Inv. Co. v. Lake Share & M.S.
Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 287 (1922).
155
One might argue that since parties can withdraw their antitrust dispute from a
court for purposes of settlement, they should be able to withdraw or opt out of court
jurisdiction for purposes of arbitrating antitrust claims. This would be a persuasive
argument if it applied to postdispute decisions to arbitrate antitrust claims. It is less
persuasive in a predispute situation, when parties have entered into a contract and
agreed to arbitrate contractual disputes without any expectation that an antitrust
claim might arise. Until Mitsubishi, parties could confidently assume that they had
not agreed to arbitrate antitrust claims when they agreed to an arbitration clause in
their contract. See supra text accompanying note 26. Because antitrust claims tend to
arise in situations where one party is likely to have much more economic power than
the other, it is quite plausible that the weaker party will have no leverage to resist an
arbitration clause in the first instance. In arbitration, the weaker party will not have
the same rights of discovery that it would have in court, which means it will be less
able to establish its case under the laws Congress enacted for its protection. By making antitrust claims arbitrable, the Supreme Court has weakened the antitrust protections enacted by Congress.
156
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 624–26
(1985).
157
See id. at 625–26.
158
See id. at 627–28.
154
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agreements covered by that Act.” The Court noted that “questions
of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the feder160
al policy favoring arbitration.”
The claim that the FAA manifests a congressional policy favoring
arbitration, widely repeated by the Supreme Court and the lower
courts, is a judicial fiction. Congress should pay attention when the
Court takes its name in vain. There is no evidence in the text or the
legislative history of the FAA that Congress in any way favored arbitra161
tion over litigation. The goal of the FAA was to provide merchants
who wanted to arbitrate the possibility of having their arbitration
162
agreements enforced.
At no time was there any discussion of “favoring” arbitration. At best, the FAA was simply supposed to make
163
arbitration contracts as enforceable as other contracts. Leveling the
playing field does not indicate a preference for arbitration.
The first Supreme Court statement that there was a federal policy favoring arbitration came from dicta in the 1983 case of Moses H.
164
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.
There, the
Court cited no authority supporting its dicta in either the text or the
legislative history of the FAA. Rather, it appears that the Court may
have relied upon lower court cases that appropriated from the collective bargaining context language that asserted arbitration was fa165
vored. Indeed, in Mitsubishi, as if to supplement the Moses Cone dicta, the Court cited as authority for a federal policy favoring
arbitration United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., a labor
166
It is true
arbitration case from the well-known Steelworkers Trilogy.
that in labor law there are strong reasons to favor arbitration because
159

Id. at 627.
Id. at 626 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
161
See, e.g., Moses, supra note 1, at 123; Schwartz, supra note 6, at 29 – 30.
162
See supra notes 136–43 and accompanying text.
163
See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (“An arbitration agreement is placed upon
the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.”).
164
See 460 U.S. at 24–25 (“Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state or procedural
policies to the contrary. . . . The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration . . . .”).
165
See, e.g., Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Audioradiowerk GmbH, 585
F.2d 39, 44–45 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing a number of collective bargaining cases as support for the premise that there was a strong policy favoring arbitration).
166
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
648–49 & n.14 (1985) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581–83 (1960)).
160
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of its contribution to industrial peace and the central role it plays in
167
the institution of collective bargaining. There is, however, no similar justification for favoring arbitration in a commercial or a non168
union setting.
As noted by labor law professor Samuel Estreicher,
“Arbitration in nonunion settings does not warrant an aggressive pro169
Similarly, in a
arbitration policy akin to the Steelworkers Trilogy.”
commercial setting there is no policy reason for favoring arbitration
over litigation. Rather, contracts to arbitrate should be no more and
170
no less enforceable than other contracts.
There is a significant difference in asserting, on the one hand,
that there is a federal policy that arbitration agreements should be
enforced according to the parties’ intent and proclaiming, on the
other hand, that there is a federal policy that favors arbitration over
litigation as a basis for broadening the scope of the FAA. It is reasonably consistent with the congressional policy of 1924 to say, as the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did in Robert Lawrence
Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., that there is a policy of promoting enforcement of arbitration agreements “to accord with the original in171
tention of the parties . . . .” But it is substantially different to claim
broadly, as the Court did in Moses Cone, that “the scope of arbitrable
167
See United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 578 (“A major factor in achieving industrial
peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the collective
bargaining agreement.”) (citation omitted).
168
See Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.KENT L. REV. 753, 797 (1990).
169
Id.
170
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967),
the Court stated that “the purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration
agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.” It should be noted,
however, that this statement was made within the context of a general understanding
that the contracts being considered were merchant contracts, not adhesion contracts. It is less clear that an arbitration agreement within an adhesion contract
should be as enforceable as other contracts. The legislative history demonstrates the
concern members of Congress had that arbitration not be mandated in a take-it-orleave-it context. See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 9–15; see also Moses, supra note 1, at
106–08 (describing hearings where Congress members expressed concern about
take-it-or-leave-it contracts). In an arbitration agreement, parties have given up important constitutional rights to a jury trial, and those rights should only be given up
knowingly and voluntarily. See Jean Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the
Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669,
678–79 (2001). Thus, it makes sense to apply a different standard of enforceability to
the separate agreement that constitutes an agreement to arbitrate within an adhesion
contract to the extent that no actual (knowing and voluntary) consent was given.
The arbitration clause should therefore be less enforceable than other agreements
within an adhesion contract, if actual consent cannot be established, and jury trial
rights were not surrendered knowingly and voluntarily.
171
271 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1959).
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issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration” and to rely, as the
Court did in Mitsubishi, on “the federal policy favoring arbitration” in
173
order to expand the coverage of the statute.
Nonetheless, this judge-created policy to favor arbitration was
the Court’s linchpin for determining that the FAA permitted antitrust claims to be arbitrated. The Mitsubishi Court found “no reason
to depart from [the policy favoring arbitration] where a party bound
by an arbitration agreement raises claims founded on statutory
174
rights.” Thus, although the text and legislative history do not provide that the FAA applies to statutes, much less to antitrust claims,
and do not suggest that Congress in any way favored arbitration over
litigation, the “federal policy favoring arbitration” was the Court’s basis for significantly expanding the statute to cover an area of law that
175
no previous court had ever held to be arbitrable. Using its own judicially-created policy as a basis for expanding the scope of a statute
far beyond its purpose is a clear example of the Court reaching
176
beyond its constitutional powers and engaging in a legislative act.
2.

The Antitrust Statute as a Basis for the Shift

In the second step of its analysis, in order to buttress its decision
that the FAA covered statutory claims, the Court shifted focus away
from the FAA and to the antitrust statute that provided the particular
substantive right. The Court asserted that if Congress did not intend
a particular statutory claim to be arbitrated, it had to indicate ex177
pressly that intention in the statute it enacted. Thus, according to
the Court, if nothing in the text or legislative history of the antitrust
law indicated that claims under the law could not be arbitrated, it
172

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25
(1983).
173
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985) (citing Moses Cone., 460 U.S. at 24–25).
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
See, e.g., Boudreau et al., supra note 16, at 964 (“When an interpreter substitutes his or her own meaning for the meaning intended by Congress, the interpreter
usurps the authority granted to the legislature by the Constitution. Such actions illegitimately undermine democratic principles.”); Molot, supra note 74, at 58 (“[T]he
constitutional structure generally requires judicial fidelity to Congress. . . . To be truly faithful to Congress, and to fulfill their role in the constitutional structure, [judges
should] respect Congress’s purposes and policies as well as the words Congress actually enacts into law[.]”).
177
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628 (stating that “[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue”).
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meant the Court could assume that such claims should be arbi178
trated.
Of course, there is no indication that Congress ever foresaw a
179
need to state that antitrust claims could not be arbitrated. Providing specifically that antitrust claims were to be determined in federal
180
court suggests that Congress did not intend them to be arbitrated,
but that was not sufficient for the Mitsubishi Court. Remarkably, it
reached its decision without regard to an earlier Supreme Court decision interpreting the language in the Sherman Act to mean that an
antitrust treble-damages case “can only be brought in a District Court
181
of the United States.”
The Court then discarded all of the policy reasons advanced by
the Second Circuit in American Safety for finding antitrust claims not
182
arbitrable and proceeded to emphasize the international nature of
the claim as a further reason to find that the antitrust claims were ar183
In future cases, however, the international rationale
bitrable.
would dim, and the Court would simply find all statutory claims arbi184
trable.

178

Id. (“We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial
forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.”).
179
At the time of the enactment of the Sherman Act (1890) and the Clayton Act
(1914), which preceded the 1925 FAA, arbitration agreements to resolve even contract disputes were not enforceable, so Congress would hardly have thought it necessary to say that antitrust claims could not be arbitrated. See Moses, supra note 1, at
123; supra notes 63–65.
180
The Sherman Act provides in pertinent part,
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States in the district where the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
181
Blumenstock Bros. Adver. Agency v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 252 U.S. 436, 440
(1920).
182
See supra text accompanying notes 148–153.
183
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631.
184
By the time of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), sixteen
years had passed since Mitsubishi and the Court had found many different kinds of
statutory claims arbitrable. In Gilmer, which involved a mandatory arbitration clause
in an age discrimination case, the Court noted that “[i]t is now clear that statutory
claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the
FAA.” Id. at 26.
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3.

The Supreme Court’s Reasoning

It is striking, however, that although the Court pointed to no
evidence in the text or legislative history of the FAA that the Act was
intended to cover statutory claims, these lacunae did not present an
impediment to arbitration of such claims because of the so called
185
“strong federal policy” favoring arbitration. One would think that
this “strong federal policy,” which, according to the Court, ensures
“that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their
186
terms,” would have produced a different result in Hall Street, where
the parties’ agreement provided for expanded judicial review. But in
that case, the Court did not focus on the strong federal policy of enforcing the parties’ agreement according to its terms, but rather on
an interpretation of the silence of the text. According to the Court,
the absence in the statutory text of any reference to party consent to
expanded judicial review meant it was prohibited. Ironically, in Mitsubishi, the Court reasoned by contrast that even though statutory
claims were not mentioned in the text, the silence of the text meant
187
that such claims were presumed to be arbitrable under the FAA.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in these two cases appears not
to be shaped by the FAA itself, but by the result the Court wished to
reach. One could easily switch the reasoning between the two cases
and reach the exactly opposite result. In Hall Street, because party
agreements for expanded judicial review are not specifically prohibited by the statute, they should be enforced consistent with the
strong federal policy to enforce arbitration agreements according to
their terms. In Mitsubishi, because the text is focused on commercial
contracts and maritime transactions, and because there is no indication in the legislative history that statutory claims were intended to be
covered by the Act, the FAA should only apply to contract claims and
maritime transactions. This reasoning—the reverse of the reasoning
applied by the Court in the two decisions—produces results that are
much more consistent with both the text and the legislative history of
the Act. In other words, in both cases, the Court got it exactly wrong.
If one attempted to reconcile the decisions in the two cases, it
could be argued that the reason the interpretive methodology differed was that the purpose in each case was the same: to interpret the
statute as broadly as possible both by expanding the scope of the FAA

185

See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478 (1989).
187
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
186
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beyond the text of the statute in Mitsubishi, and by narrowing the defenses to enforcement in Hall Street through a strict reading of the statutory text. While this may be true, this simply demonstrates that the
methodology was result-oriented, and that the result had nothing to
do with legislative intent. Rather, the result sought and achieved was
a judicial goal of reducing access to the courts by dramatically expanding the scope of the FAA, and narrowing the defenses to enforcement of arbitral awards.
In each of these two cases, the Court’s decision limited access of
parties to the courts. In Hall Street, by refusing to permit parties to
agree to expanded judicial review, and by excluding “manifest disregard of the law” as a ground for judicial review, the Court eliminated
court access that could provide a possible safety net for parties in the
188
form of judicial review of the legal basis of an award. In Mitsubishi,
by expanding the coverage of the FAA to statutory claims, the Court
denied access to courts for parties, including parties to adhesion contracts, whose claims might arise under statutes intended by Congress
189
to protect parties’ rights through litigation.
Neither of the Court’s decisions is supported by the FAA’s text,
on which the Court, in both cases, claimed to rely. Moreover, the
combination of the two decisions produced a very poor result. It is
noteworthy that the Court in Mitsubishi gave lip service to the need to
review arbitrators’ decisions in this area. It suggested that if U.S. antitrust laws were not properly applied by a tribunal sitting in Japan, the
Court would be able to take a “second look” at the enforcement
stage, and potentially vacate an improper award under a public policy
190
The Court has not, however, taken a “second look” at
exception.
191
awards based on statutory claims. And yet, as will be discussed be188

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part III.B.1–2.
190
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638 (“Having permitted the arbitration to go forward,
the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the awardenforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the
antitrust laws has been addressed.”). The Court has also asserted that “although
judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient
to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute.” Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987); see also Philip J.
McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A “Second Look” at International
Commercial Arbitration, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 457 (1999).
191
See, e.g., Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the Tribunal and Beyond: International
Commercial Arbitration and United States Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 17, 52
(2002) (“It has been well-documented that courts have yet to engage in the second
look analysis that Mitsubishi contemplated.”); McConnaughay, supra note 190, at 457
(“The Court’s ‘second look’ has not yet occurred.”); Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival
189
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low, the expansion of arbitration to cover statutory claims creates a
greater, not a lesser need, for meaningful judicial review. Rather
than waiting for the Court to take a second look, it is time for Congress to take a close look at U.S. arbitration law, which no longer resembles the FAA enacted in 1925, but rather has been transmogrified
into an altogether different law enacted by the Supreme Court.
IV. THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. The Difference in Contract Claims and Statutory Claims
Contract claims differ substantially from statutory claims. When
an arbitrator is interpreting a contract, she is largely trying to determine what the parties intended, how they expected the contract to
apply to the facts and circumstances that have occurred, what rights
and obligations they allocated to each other, or how they would have
allocated them if they had foreseen the events that actually occurred.
These tend to be the kinds of issues that the parties, if they had been
more careful or insightful or better able to anticipate future events,
could have themselves negotiated in the contract. The arbitrator
thus tends to function in this situation as a kind of agent—a private
party that other private parties have asked to decide issues that were
192
within their power to decide.
Claims under statutes raise quite different issues, because they
do not deal simply with agreements between private parties. Instead,
the Supreme Court’s declaration that statutory claims are arbitrable
was a major delegation of judicial power to private citizen-arbitrators,
who have no accountability to the public. The arbitrator is no longer
simply an agent for the parties, deciding issues that they could have
negotiated themselves. Instead, he is implementing public law that
of the “Have-Nots” in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341, 367 n.154 (2007) (“[T]he
Second Look Doctrine has proven to be largely an empty threat.”).
192
See Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration: Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, in
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 95, at 88, 113–14.
[T]he rationale for limiting vacatur of arbitration awards to grounds
that correspond to the grounds for denying enforcement to contracts
generally is that the arbitrator, as the parties’ agent, is resolving questions that the parties could have resolved themselves when they drafted
the contract. That rationale does not apply when the arbitrator is resolving issues the parties could not have resolved themselves when they
drafted the contract. Those are issues about violations of rights conferred by mandatory rules. . . .
. . . [W]hen arbitrators hear claims arising out of mandatory rules,
courts should review de novo the arbitrators’ legal rulings on such
claims.
Id.
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has the power to impact not only the immediate parties but also the
public interest and the decisions of Congress as to policies that best
serve the public interest.
Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mitsubishi to permit arbitration of statutory claims created a major paradigm shift. Delegating the judiciary’s power to enforce a statute to arbitrators who have
no real accountability to reach a decision in accordance with the law
is a huge step to take in the absence of congressional input. Further,
this step has a real impact on the enforcement of the law. As Justice
Stevens has noted, an arbitrator “has no institutional obligation to
193
enforce federal legislative policy.”
An arbitral tribunal will most
likely view its obligations to the parties before it, not to the public in194
terest. As a result, when arbitrators are deciding claims under public law, there is a high potential for negative externalities. For example, if an arbitrator makes a wrong decision in a matter arising under
the antitrust laws, that decision may negatively affect not only the
claimants but the rights of everyone else affected by the anticompetitive behavior. As the Second Circuit noted in Am. Safety
Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., “Antitrust violations can affect
hundreds of thousands—perhaps millions—of people and inflict
195
staggering economic damage.” Yet in arbitration, the public interest in how such laws are enforced may be detrimentally affected with
no possible recourse.
Enforcement of other statutory claims raise similar concerns. In
1981, Chief Justice Burger in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,

193
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 649
(Stevens, J. dissenting).
194
McConnaughay, supra note 190, at 515 n.243.
I wish to emphasize my belief that even exacting judicial review of
mandatory law arbitral awards is woefully inadequate for the public
judicial resolution of such claims. In my view, the substitution of private, privately paid arbitrators for a public judge, particularly for a U.S.
district court judge, is so profound a deprivation of the intended enforcement schemes of most mandatory laws that even exacting arbitral
adherence to public court rules of evidence and procedure is not likely
to yield “correct” mandatory law results as consistently as public court
adjudication. Private arbitrators, no matter how skilled, are appointed
to serve the interests and expectations of the parties to the arbitration,
not the public; arbitrators’ interest in the legally correct resolution of
mandatory law claims pales in comparison to their interest in resolving
disputes in ways that serve their perceptions of the interests of the private parties before them.
Id.
195
391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968).
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Inc. discussing the possibility that employers might contract to arbitrate civil rights claims, said:
Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional objectives
behind a statute seeking to enforce civil rights protected by Title
VII to allow the very forces that had practiced discrimination to
contract away the right to enforce civil rights in the courts. For
federal courts to defer to arbitral decisions reached by the same
combination of forces that had long perpetuated invidious discrimination would have made the foxes guardians of the chick196
ens.

Nonetheless, today the Supreme Court’s paradigm shift regarding statutory claims permits courts to do exactly what Justice Burger
found objectionable: enforce arbitration agreements between employers and employees requiring arbitration of claims based on civil
rights statutes. Congress should seriously question whether civil
rights claims can be adequately protected when plaintiffs are denied
access to the court.
Resolving statutory claims based on mandatory law outside of
the court system also means that there is no judicial review on the
merits to ensure that the law is properly applied. Moreover, the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings and the lack of any precedent
created by awards not only prevent development of the law, but also
will not clarify what the law requires or deter potential violators.
In addition, arbitration does not provide the same level of pro197
tection as the courts do because of the limitations on discovery.
The purpose of many of the laws that Congress has passed in the
areas of antitrust, civil rights, consumer protection, and securities was
198
to protect the weaker party. Unlike cases between two merchants of
196

450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In Barrentine, the Court
held that employees could pursue their wage claims in federal court under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and were not barred by arbitration under a collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 745 (majority opinion). Chief Justice Burger agreed
that civil rights claims should have a judicial forum, but dissented as to FLSA claims.
Id. at 750 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
197
See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 648 n.14 (Stevens, J. dissenting); Carrington & Haagen, supra note 1, at 348 (“[I]t cannot be doubted that the availability of discovery
assures that courts are in general more effective than arbitral tribunals in detecting
wrongdoing and enforcing the rights of victims, whether of securities fraud, pricefixing conspiracies, race or gender discrimination, or environmental misdeeds.”).
198
See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 1, at 332–33 (“[T]he Court has enforced
arbitration clauses that were until recently deemed invalid impairments of rights
conferred by Congress in its regulation of commerce, thereby weakening enforcement of the national law. . . . Those who have been prejudiced by the Court’s handiwork include many American consumers, patients, workers, investors, shopkeepers,
shippers, and passengers.”).
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approximately equal bargaining power, in cases where bargaining
power is unequal, the stronger party generally controls most of the
documentation necessary to prove a violation. Because discovery is
much more limited in arbitration than in litigation, a party making a
complex statutory claim is likely to have greater difficulty proving its
case in arbitration and therefore will be less able to vindicate the
rights Congress intended the law to provide.
Moreover, Hall Street and Mitsubishi make clear that even though
arbitrators have been given the power to resolve complex statutory
claims, there is no judicial review possible to ensure that they carry
out the aims of the enacting Congress. As noted above, the possibility
of vacating an award on the basis of “manifest disregard of the law”
199
appears to have been eliminated in Hall Street, and the Court has
never actually taken the “second look” that it claimed in Mitsubishi
would be possible at the enforcement stage of an arbitration award
200
involving statutory claims.
Alarm bells should be sounding in Congress. The Court has
delegated judicial power to private citizen-arbitrators to resolve disputes arising under public laws crafted by Congress to protect individual rights and promote fairness in commerce. All of this has been
done with no input from Congress. It is time for Congress to focus
on what is happening and to take back its legislative role.
B. Congress Should Get into the Act
The Supreme Court’s legislation on arbitration has occurred
without the benefit of any comprehensive study of the field, collection and analysis of information, testimony at hearings, or any input
of the kind generally made available to Congress when it is in the
process of enacting important legislation. Thus, the FAA has evolved
as a legislative program without any systemic coherence. The main
factor motivating the Supreme Court appears to have been to remove
as many disputes as possible from the courts. In the process, arbitration has mushroomed as a dispute settlement device without adequate attention to its overall impact within the system of justice, its
potential abuses (including lack of actual consent) and its ability to
undercut regulatory protections that Congress has included in statutes governing employment, civil rights, antitrust, securities, and
consumer protection.

199
200

See supra Part II.B.2.d.
See supra note 191.
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Both the elimination of “manifest disregard of the law” as a
separate ground for vacating an award that is based on an erroneous
conclusion of law and the elimination of the possibility for parties to
seek judicial review on the merits are at odds with the need to take a
closer look at what private citizen-arbitrators are doing in terms of enforcing public laws. A number of commentators have posited that
arbitration of public or mandatory laws should be subject to a higher
201
level of scrutiny.
Professor Stephen Ware has stated that “courts
should review arbitrators’ legal rulings on claims arising out of man202
datory rules.” An arbitrator should not be free to misapply mandatory rules, and his awards should be reviewed to ensure correct appli203
cation of the law.
Dean Philip J. McConnaughay has concluded
that:
[T]he Supreme Court should clearly differentiate between the
scope of review appropriate for nonmandatory law arbitral awards
and the scope of review appropriate for mandatory law arbitral
awards, confining review of the former to traditionally restrictive
notions of basic procedural fairness, but expanding review of the
latter to require close arbitral conformance to American stan204
dards of procedure and demonstrably correct outcomes.

Commentators such as Professor Ware and Dean McConnaughay, as well as some members of the judiciary, see a distinct difference
between arbitral awards based on contract, and awards based on
201

See, e.g., Ware, supra note 192; McConnaughay, supra note 190, at 457, 514–15,

523.
Unless U.S. courts are determined to abdicate completely their responsibility for participating in the enforcement of mandatory U.S. law,
they must undertake some review of international arbitral resolutions
of claims arising under mandatory U.S. law, and their review must depart significantly from current standards that properly permit virtually
no merits reviews of arbitral resolutions of nonmandatory law claims.
Id. at 514.
202
Ware, supra note 14, at 739. While some arbitrations of contract claims involve
interpreting statutes, such as provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, see U.C.C.
§ 1-102(3) (2004), most of those provisions are default provisions that the parties can
contract around. Thus, few mandatory provisions of law are involved. In contrast, in
employment discrimination claims, for example, the provisions of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 are mandatory. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006)
203
See Ware, supra note 192, at 114; see also Richard E. Speidel, Speidel’s Revised
Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT, supra note 95, at 352, 374 (proposing to amend Chapter 2 of the FAA to
provide, in part, “In an arbitration subject to the [N.Y.] Convention, a court may . . .
deny recognition and enforcement on grounds of public policy if the award decides
issues of mandatory law in the United States and that award contains clear errors of
law or fact.”).
204
See McConnaughay, supra note 190, at 523.
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mandatory rules that parties are not allowed to contract around. The
mandatory law awards should not be left to stand on an erroneous
205
conclusion of law. As U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Judge Diane Wood has noted, if “arbitration is to play a significant
role in the enforcement of public law, then arbitration itself must be206
come more publicly accountable.”
Such accountability “may require a careful expansion of the grounds on which ultimate awards
207
can be reviewed in the courts.” There is obvious concern within the
legal community that the Court’s delegation to private citizenarbitrators of broad power to decide questions of mandatory law with
no possible review for error has had a deleterious effect on our legal
system.
Congress should give very thoughtful consideration to whether
the delegation to arbitrators of the judicial power to decide claims
under regulatory statutes may undermine the protections that Congress intended to provide when it enacted specific statutes. If Congress determined that the intended protections are not adequately
upheld through arbitration, it could reestablish what it intended
when it originally enacted the FAA, i.e., that the FAA does not cover
claims arising under statutes. This would simply return arbitration to
the status it had for most of the time since the enactment of the
208
FAA.
Alternatively, Congress could undertake a review of each class of
statutes (i.e., securities, antitrust, employment, civil rights, consumer
protection) in order to consider the purpose and the remedy intended by Congress upon enactment. Those statutes whose remedies
do not seem appropriate for arbitration because the protections they
provide are better suited to be enforced in a judicial proceeding than
an arbitral one should be excluded from the coverage of the FAA.
Congress could also determine that some claims, based on either
statute or contract, might be reasonably arbitrated only if the decision to arbitrate was made postdispute, rather than predispute. In
fact, the thrust of several bills currently pending before Congress is to
render unenforceable any predispute arbitration agreement in cer-

205

See id.
Diane P. Wood, The Brave New World of Arbitration, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 411
(2003).
207
Id.
208
With the exception of Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), which
found that a fraud claim should be arbitrated even though it was asserted under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, no statutory claims were found arbitrable by the
Supreme Court until Mitsubishi in 1985.
206
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tain classes of cases. For example, the Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act provides that predispute arbitration agreements between a long-term care facility and a resident of that facility are not
209
valid and not specifically enforceable.
Similarly, the Consumer
Fairness Act of 2009 prohibits predispute arbitration clauses in con210
sumer transactions or consumer contracts. The most significant bill
before Congress on arbitration, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
would make unenforceable a “pre-dispute arbitration agreement . . .
[that] requires arbitration of an employment, consumer, franchise,
211
or civil rights dispute.”
Drafters of these bills want to eliminate predispute arbitrations
in situations where there is very different economic power and
212
asymmetric knowledge between the parties to the agreement. Postdispute arbitration is viewed as more acceptable because once the
parties know and understand what issues are in dispute, if both parties agree to arbitrate, the process is more likely to be based on actual
consent, rather than imposed by the economically powerful party on
213
the weaker party. In employment disputes, for example, if arbitra209
H.R. 1237, 111th Cong. § 17(b) (2009). The bill would amend Chapter I, Title
9, United States Code (the basic FAA provision) by adding a new section 17, which
would define a long-term care facility and prohibit predispute arbitration agreements. The Senate version of the bill, S. 512, 111th Cong. (2009), contains very similar language, but would amend sections 1 and 2 of Chapter I of Title 9 to include this
language, rather than adding it at the end in a new section.
210
H.R. 991, 111th Cong. § 1003(a) (2009).
211
S. 931, 111th Cong. § 402(a) (2009). S. 931 differs in a number of ways from
H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009), which is similar to a prior bill that had been introduced in the previous Congress, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007). The major changes
in the new Senate bill are: first, that it provides for all of its changes to be in a new
Chapter 4 of the FAA, S. 931 § 3(a); second, that it defines franchise dispute as involving a franchisee having a principal place of business in the United States, id.;
third, it appears to overturn the Supreme Court decision in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett,
1229 S. Ct. 1456 (2009), by making clear that employees covered by collective bargaining agreements requiring arbitration will still have the right to raise statutory
rights in court; and finally, although the court (rather than the arbitrator) is allocated the power to determine the validity and enforceability of the arbitration
agreement, S. 931 § 3(a), this provision only applies to those agreements described
in the new Chapter 4, and therefore is unlikely to have a major impact on international arbitration agreements. Id. Criticism of the earlier version of the bill, which
was the same as the current House version, included suggestions that allocation to
the court of the determination of an arbitration agreement’s validity eliminated the
widely accepted international doctrines of separability and competence-competence,
and would therefore negatively affect international arbitrations. See Edna Sussman,
The Arbitration Fairness Act: Unintended Consequences Threaten U.S. Business, 18 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 455, 477–81 (2007).
212
See S. 931 § 2; H.R. 1020 § 2.
213
See S. 931 § 2; H.R. 1020 § 2.
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tion were only possible if chosen postdispute, employers would have
more incentive to ensure that the process were perceived as fair, so
214
that parties would choose arbitration.
These bills, if adopted, would forestall some of the abuses of arbitration, particularly when the stronger party imposes it on the
weaker party without actual consent. None of this legislation, however, would deal with the problem of the need for a higher level of
scrutiny of arbitration decisions determining questions of mandatory
law. Even if all of the above referenced legislation were adopted,
Congress should still confront the issue of judicial review of arbitral
awards. Congress could, after first considering whether arbitration of
rights granted under a regulatory statute is appropriate, determine
that certain rights could be reasonably well protected in arbitration
and, therefore, that arbitration of claims arising under such statute
should be allowed. In such a case, it should then provide for appropriate judicial review of arbitral awards resolving claims under that
statute. This could be done simply by providing as an additional
ground under the FAA that any claims arising under the particular
statute or statutes can be reviewed on the merits.
If such a framework were created, Congress should also consider
whether it should be limited to domestic arbitrations. While there
are reasons judicial review on the merits might not be advisable with
215
respect to international awards, such review should not cause a
problem with respect to domestic awards. Having judicial review on
the merits for awards based on mandatory law would serve the purposes of providing recourse for erroneous decisions, ensuring that
the decision serves the public interest, and providing for the development of the law by creating precedents. It would help to keep
these statutory protections from being undercut by private decisionmakers with no accountability to the government or to the public interest.

214

See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 3 (discussing flaws in mandatory pre-dispute arbitration). See generally David Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1247 (2009) (responding to criticisms of the Arbitration Fairness Act).
215
Including mistake of law as an additional ground for review with respect to an
international arbitration may cause enforcement problems in foreign jurisdictions.
See Margaret L. Moses, Can Parties Tell Courts What to Do? Expanded Judicial Review of
Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 429, 456–65 (2004). An award that was vacated on
the basis of an erroneous conclusion of law might nonetheless be enforced in foreign
jurisdictions. Id. Foreign jurisdictions may enforce a vacated award, unless it was vacated on narrow statutory or treaty-based grounds, which usually do not include mistake of law. Id.
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Congress should also consider legislation to overturn the
Court’s decision in Hall Street on the question of expanded judicial
review. If heightened judicial review were available for mandatory
law claims, there would be less need for expanded judicial review because many claims would already be reviewable for mistakes of law.
Nonetheless, there would still be arbitral awards based on contract
claims not subject to heightened scrutiny, which some parties might
wish to have reviewed by a court. Because arbitration is founded on
consent, parties who consent to arbitration should be allowed to
choose to arbitrate on the condition that the arbitrator’s award be
subject to court review. Denying the choice means that parties with
that concern will simply litigate, so that the court would have the entire controversy before it rather than a mere review function. Before
Hall Street, even when certain courts of appeals were willing to provide
216
expanded judicial review, few parties requested it. Thus, providing
the choice to parties would not likely change the nature of arbitration, nor would it flood the courts with substantive challenges. Most
parties arbitrating contract issues would still opt for an arbitration
process that would end with a final and binding award, unreviewable
on the merits.
As with claims under statutes, if Congress provided for review of
legal errors whenever parties agreed to such review, there could be
217
possible enforcement issues in some foreign courts, but the practice
would not present problems of enforcement in the United States.
Parties aware that they might need to enforce an award in a foreign
jurisdiction would simply not agree to expanded judicial review.
Permitting parties the choice of expanded judicial review would affirm party autonomy and the advantage that arbitration offers of
permitting parties to tailor a dispute process to their particular needs.
It would also provide comfort to certain nervous parties who would
like to arbitrate disputes but are afraid to “bet the company” on the
unreviewable decision of a private citizen-arbitrator.
V. CONCLUSION
Major changes have taken place in the administration of justice
in the last few decades. The Supreme Court’s decision that private
citizen-arbitrators can interpret and apply mandatory law, subject to
no judicial review on the merits, undermines statutory protections
created by Congress. The Supreme Court has undertaken the devel216
217

See supra note 32.
See Moses, supra note 215, at 456–65.
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opment of the law of arbitration with disregard for the text and the
legislative history of the FAA, such that it amounts to pure judicial
legislation. This is not the proper role of the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the Court has proceeded apace to lock in its legislative program. In its recent decision in Hall Street, it eliminated the possibility
of judicial review of any mistakes of law by arbitrators, even where
218
both parties agreed to it, and it did so at a time when it was increasingly apparent that mandatory law should not be left to private citizen-arbitrators who have no accountability to apply the law in a way
that will uphold the protections enacted by Congress.
It is time for Congress to reassert itself as the proper, constitutionally empowered source of arbitration laws and policies, and to
take steps to protect the legislation it has enacted. Arbitration loses
credibility as a process to the extent that it becomes increasingly inconsistent with the public’s perception of a fair means of resolving
disputes and of ensuring that legislated protections under mandatory
law are enforced. By taking back the lead in determining the proper
role and function of arbitration within our system of justice, Congress
would go far toward preserving arbitration as a useful and workable
means of resolving disputes. For this to happen, however, there must
be a sense that the process is fair, and that arbitral awards resolving
statutory claims will not stand upon erroneous conclusions of law.

218

Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403–05 (2008).

